Skip to content

Palestine Under the Mandate: The Great Arab Revolt

Between 1936 and 1939, Palestine experienced a sustained rebellion against British rule and the expansion of the Zionist national project. Beginning with a general strike and developing into a rural insurgency, the revolt exposed the contradictions of the British Mandate, transformed relations between Palestinian Arabs and Jews, and forced London to reconsider the political future of a country whose inhabitants held profoundly different national aspirations.

Robert M. Dobo
Nov 21, 202638 min read

gathering of Palestinian Arabs at Abu Ghosh, west of Jerusalem, photographed during the 1936 uprising against British Mandate rule.

Period: 1917–1939, principally April 1936–September 1939

Region: British Mandate Palestine and the wider Middle East

By Robert M. Dobo • WorldRecast.com


A Country in Revolt

In the spring of 1936, the commercial life of Arab Palestine began to shut down. Shops closed in Jerusalem, Nablus and Jaffa. Arab dockworkers abandoned their work at Jaffa's harbour, bringing much of the port's ordinary business to a halt. Transport workers stopped operating their vehicles, merchants suspended trading, and committees organized collections to support families deprived of their income. What began as a protest against British policy and Jewish immigration became one of the longest general strikes in modern history.

The strike was remarkable not simply for its duration but for the breadth of the society it mobilized. Merchants joined workers, students participated alongside established political figures, and villagers increasingly became involved in a campaign that extended beyond the cities. Palestinian Arab women organized demonstrations, raised money and helped sustain the movement. For many participants, the immediate demands were clear: Britain should end Jewish immigration, restrict the transfer of Arab land to Jewish ownership, and establish a representative national government.

The British authorities regarded these demands as incompatible with their obligations under the League of Nations Mandate. Zionist leaders, meanwhile, viewed restrictions on immigration and settlement as threats to the Jewish national home, particularly as antisemitic persecution intensified across Europe. The government responsible for preserving public order was consequently caught between commitments that appeared increasingly difficult to reconcile.

The general strike ended in October 1936, but the rebellion did not. Over the following three years, armed groups challenged British authority across the countryside, attacked Jewish settlements and communications, and attempted to establish their own systems of local administration. British forces responded with an increasingly extensive counterinsurgency campaign involving thousands of soldiers, emergency regulations, collective punishments, detention and the destruction of property. By 1938, the revolt had grown into a major colonial military emergency. Its eventual defeat in 1939 left thousands dead and Palestinian Arab society politically and economically weakened.*1

The Great Arab Revolt cannot be understood as merely another episode in the history of Arab-Jewish violence. It was simultaneously an anti-colonial rebellion, a struggle over immigration and land, a conflict between competing national movements, and a confrontation within Palestinian society over leadership, social authority and the methods of resistance. It also unfolded while European Jews faced worsening persecution, making the question of Palestine inseparable from a humanitarian emergency that Britain and other governments were failing adequately to address.

Nor should the events of 1936–1939 be understood simply as the opening act of the war that created Israel in 1948. The participants did not know what would happen a decade later. They operated within a political world in which continued British administration, Arab-majority independence, a Jewish national home within a shared state, partition, and other constitutional arrangements remained subjects of serious debate. Understanding why these alternatives failed requires beginning with the political settlement established after the First World War.

From Ottoman Palestine to British Rule

Before the First World War, Palestine formed part of the Ottoman Empire. Its population was predominantly Arabic-speaking and Muslim, alongside substantial Christian communities and a smaller Jewish population with deep historical connections to the country. Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Nablus, Hebron and Gaza possessed distinct social and economic identities, while villages, farming communities and regional trading networks connected the countryside to the towns.

Palestinian political identities were neither static nor uniform. People understood themselves through family, locality, religion, Ottoman citizenship and wider Arab affiliations. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, newspapers, schools, political associations and debates over Ottoman constitutional reform helped develop a more explicitly Palestinian territorial consciousness. The arrival of Zionist settlers and the prospect of European intervention contributed to this development, but Palestinian national identity did not emerge solely in reaction to Zionism. It developed within broader transformations affecting the Ottoman Arab provinces.*2

Modern political Zionism likewise emerged from circumstances extending far beyond Palestine. European Jewish emancipation had not ended antisemitism, and the persecution, exclusion and violence experienced by Jewish communities encouraged competing responses, including socialism, cultural nationalism, emigration and the pursuit of a Jewish national home. Zionism gave political expression to the conviction that Jews constituted a people entitled to collective national self-determination. Palestine held particular significance because of its religious, historical and cultural relationship to Jewish life.

Jewish immigration to Palestine had begun increasing under Ottoman rule, accompanied by the establishment of agricultural settlements and institutions intended to support a developing Jewish society. These efforts brought new investment and economic activity, but they also introduced disputes over land ownership, employment and political sovereignty. The purchase of land by Zionist organizations sometimes displaced Arab tenants and cultivators whose livelihoods depended upon properties legally owned by others. The consequences varied by region and transaction, yet fears of displacement became an increasingly important feature of Palestinian political debate.

The British conquest of Palestine during the First World War transformed these tensions into a central problem of imperial administration.

On November 2, 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour issued a declaration supporting the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, while stipulating that the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities should not be prejudiced. The declaration did not explicitly promise an independent Jewish state, nor did it define precisely what a national home would eventually become. Nevertheless, its endorsement of Jewish national aspirations was politically consequential.

For Palestinian Arabs, the declaration raised an immediate question of legitimacy. Britain had committed itself to facilitating a national project in a country where the great majority of inhabitants were not Jewish, without obtaining that majority's consent. The declaration referred to those inhabitants as non-Jewish communities and protected their civil and religious rights, but it offered no equivalent recognition of their collective political or national rights.*3

Britain's wartime correspondence with Sharif Hussein of Mecca created an additional controversy. Arab nationalists maintained that British promises concerning Arab independence encompassed Palestine, while British officials disputed that interpretation. The disagreement over the Hussein-McMahon correspondence persisted throughout the Mandate and became an important element of the competing claims made to British authorities.

Following the war, the League of Nations formally approved the Mandate for Palestine on July 24, 1922; it entered into force in September 1923. Article 2 required Britain to establish conditions supporting the Jewish national home, develop self-governing institutions and safeguard the civil and religious rights of all inhabitants. Article 6 instructed the administration to facilitate Jewish immigration and encourage Jewish settlement on the land, subject to protections for other sections of the population.

These provisions did not establish a clear constitutional destination. Britain was expected to assist Jewish national development while gradually advancing self-government in a country with an Arab majority deeply opposed to the Zionist programme. The Jewish Agency received formal recognition as a body able to advise and cooperate with the administration in matters affecting the Jewish national home. Palestinian Arabs possessed no equivalent institution with comparable standing under the Mandate.*4

The British developed roads, ports, administrative services, courts and other institutions, but the central political contradiction remained unresolved. A representative legislature elected according to population would almost certainly contain an Arab majority, which could seek to restrict immigration and settlement. Zionist leaders feared that such a government would undermine the national home before it could develop into a secure political community. British attempts to design a representative system repeatedly encountered this impasse.

Over time, the Jewish community of Palestine, increasingly known as the Yishuv, developed institutions capable of organizing immigration, economic activity, education and security. The Histadrut labour federation, Jewish Agency, representative bodies and Haganah defence organization gave the Yishuv growing organizational capacity.

Palestinian Arab society also possessed political parties, religious institutions, municipal governments, unions, newspapers and associations. Yet its national leadership remained fragmented, often divided by family rivalries, differing political strategies and unequal access to British officials. Unlike the Jewish Agency, Palestinian national institutions were not incorporated into the Mandate's constitutional framework in a manner that conferred comparable authority.*5

Immigration, Land and a Changing Society

The demographic changes of the 1920s and 1930s intensified the struggle over Palestine's future. Jewish immigration increased substantially during the Mandate, particularly after Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in January 1933. The Nazi regime's persecution of German Jews, combined with antisemitism and economic insecurity elsewhere in Europe, made emigration an increasingly urgent necessity.

By 1936, Jews constituted approximately 28 per cent of Palestine's population, compared with roughly 11 per cent at the time of the 1922 census. Immigration during the preceding years had been especially substantial. The influx brought capital, professional skills, commercial development and expanding Jewish settlements, but it also strengthened Palestinian Arab fears that demographic change would eventually determine political sovereignty.*6

The motives of the immigrants mattered. Some arrived with an explicit commitment to constructing a Jewish national society. Others were primarily fleeing persecution and searching for safety. These motivations frequently overlapped, but they were not identical. Nor were the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine politically homogeneous. Labour Zionists, religious Zionists, Revisionists, older Jewish communities and smaller non-Zionist groups did not necessarily share the same political objectives or methods.

For Palestinian Arabs, however, the cumulative effects of immigration were increasingly difficult to separate from the larger Zionist programme. Land acquisitions altered agricultural relationships, while the promotion of exclusively Jewish labour in parts of the developing Jewish economy limited opportunities for some Arab workers. These developments operated alongside wider problems of rural indebtedness, inadequate agricultural investment, population growth and uneven economic modernization.

Not every land sale resulted in displacement, and the economic relationship between Arab and Jewish communities included substantial cooperation, shared workplaces and commercial exchange. Nevertheless, the institutions of the two national movements increasingly encouraged economic separation. The result was not a single, uniform economy but a complicated landscape of interdependence, competition and growing political division.*7

For a Palestinian cultivator facing debt, the prospect of losing access to land could be as politically significant as any constitutional argument. For an Arab railway employee, disputes over hiring and wages could become disputes over national rights. For a newly arrived Jewish refugee, immigration restrictions could determine whether family members trapped in Europe had any realistic possibility of escape.

These overlapping realities made the conflict unusually resistant to compromise. Jewish national development could not be reduced to an imperial conspiracy, nor could Palestinian opposition be dismissed as hostility to modernization or religious prejudice. Both national movements possessed substantial historical experiences and political aspirations, but their preferred futures increasingly appeared mutually exclusive within a single territory.

The Road to Rebellion

Political opposition to the Mandate had developed long before 1936. Palestinian Arab leaders petitioned British officials, organized national congresses and demanded representative government. Their efforts generally failed to secure the constitutional changes they sought.

Violence had also periodically disrupted relations between Arabs and Jews. The disturbances of 1920 and 1921 exposed the fragility of British authority, while the much larger violence of August 1929 demonstrated how disputes over religious sites and national claims could rapidly become deadly. Tensions surrounding the Western Wall, known to Muslims as al-Buraq, helped precipitate attacks and reprisals across Palestine.

The 1929 violence included the massacre of Jews in Hebron, where a longstanding Jewish community suffered devastating losses, as well as attacks elsewhere. Arabs were also killed, including by British security forces. The events left enduring fear and bitterness, demonstrating that civilians could become targets because of their communal identity rather than any direct participation in political conflict.

British investigations subsequently acknowledged serious Arab grievances concerning immigration and land. The Hope Simpson inquiry and the Passfield White Paper of 1930 raised questions about the economic consequences of settlement and the availability of land for Arab cultivators. Zionist opposition to restrictions, followed by British policy reassurances in 1931, persuaded many Palestinian Arabs that even official recognition of their grievances would not produce meaningful change.*8

The political atmosphere deteriorated further after 1933. Palestinian demonstrations increasingly targeted the British administration itself rather than Jewish communities alone. In October that year, protests in Jerusalem and Jaffa were met by police force, producing casualties and strengthening the conviction among younger activists that constitutional appeals had exhausted their usefulness.

Events elsewhere in the Arab world provided an important context. Iraq had achieved formal independence in 1932, although British influence remained substantial. Egyptian nationalists continued to challenge Britain's position, while Syrian nationalists were engaged in a confrontation with French mandatory authorities. In early 1936, a major general strike in Syria demonstrated the potential of sustained collective action to force imperial governments into negotiations.

Palestinian activists followed these developments closely. Their movement belonged to a wider interwar struggle over the meaning of self-determination and the legitimacy of European rule.

A particularly significant influence was the preacher and activist Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Born in Syria and active in the Haifa region, al-Qassam developed a following among workers, poorer urban residents and rural migrants. He criticized both British authority and Zionist expansion, advocating armed resistance rather than continued dependence on petitions and elite negotiations.

Al-Qassam organized a clandestine network that challenged the established methods of Palestinian politics. In November 1935, he was killed during a confrontation with British forces near Ya'bad. His death and funeral generated considerable popular emotion. For supporters, he became a symbol of sacrifice and resistance; his example also helped demonstrate the political influence of activists operating outside the traditional leadership.*9

Another event contributed to the atmosphere of suspicion. In October 1935, authorities discovered a shipment of weapons concealed in cargo at Jaffa harbour and intended for Jewish recipients associated with the Haganah. The discovery reinforced Palestinian fears that the Jewish national project was acquiring the military capabilities necessary to defend and perhaps expand its political position.

By early 1936, Palestinian Arab political leaders faced an increasingly impatient population. British constitutional proposals offered little prospect of immediate national self-government, immigration remained controversial, and younger militants questioned the effectiveness of the established parties. The conditions for an uprising were already present.

The immediate sequence began on April 15, 1936, when armed men associated with al-Qassam's movement attacked traffic near Nablus, killing two Jews. Members of a Jewish extremist organization subsequently killed two Arabs in retaliation. Tensions escalated into wider violence, particularly around Jaffa and Tel Aviv.

The killings were not an organized declaration of national rebellion by the established Palestinian leadership. Rather, they triggered an explosion of grievances that political activists rapidly attempted to channel into collective action. Local national committees appeared, strikes spread, and the established political parties found themselves struggling to catch up with events.*10

The General Strike: April–October 1936

The general strike was initially an expression of popular mobilization rather than a campaign fully controlled from above. Local activists, workers and nationalist committees helped initiate the stoppages. The established Palestinian political leadership then sought to coordinate the movement through a central organization.

On April 25, 1936, representatives of the principal Arab political parties established the Arab Higher Committee, chaired by Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The committee represented an unusual attempt to overcome factional divisions in pursuit of common national demands.

Members of the Arab Higher Committee in 1936. The leadership included Raghib al-Nashashibi and Hajj Amin al-Husayni, whose political rivalries complicated efforts to coordinate the national movement.

These demands centred on the termination of Jewish immigration, the prohibition of further transfers of Arab land to Jewish ownership, and the establishment of a representative national government. They reflected the view that immigration and settlement were not simply economic activities but processes through which the political future of Palestine was being transformed without the consent of its Arab majority.

Al-Husayni was an influential but controversial leader. His position as Grand Mufti and his presidency of the Supreme Muslim Council gave him religious and institutional prominence, while his political activities placed him at the centre of the nationalist movement. Yet other Palestinian figures, including members of the Nashashibi family and supporters of alternative parties, disagreed with his leadership and methods. The Arab Higher Committee temporarily concealed rather than eliminated these rivalries.

The strike nevertheless achieved an impressive degree of participation. Jaffa's dockworkers suspended operations, transport workers brought substantial portions of Arab commercial transport to a halt, and traders closed their establishments. National committees collected funds, distributed assistance, disseminated political instructions and coordinated demonstrations.

Jaffa harbour during the six-month Arab general strike of 1936. The disruption of port activity was an important element of the campaign to pressure the British administration.

As historian Zachary Lockman has shown, workers played an essential role in the movement. The participation of transport unions and dockworkers gave the strike an economic force that could not have been achieved through elite political declarations alone. For many labour activists, national grievances were connected to employment, wages and the changing economic balance between Arab and Jewish institutions.*11

The strike was not complete, however. Haifa's port continued operating, partly because of local political circumstances and partly because of the organization of the labour force. Jewish workers and institutions helped maintain commercial activities that Arab nationalists hoped to interrupt.

The Histadrut and other Zionist organizations used the crisis to strengthen Jewish economic independence. The construction and operation of a separate port facility at Tel Aviv reduced dependence on Jaffa, while the increased employment of Jewish workers in strategic occupations reinforced an economic separation already developing before 1936.

These developments represented an important unintended consequence of the strike. Palestinian nationalists hoped to impose economic pressure sufficient to force Britain to change its policies. Instead, parts of the Jewish economy acquired additional infrastructure and institutional strength, while Arab businesses endured a prolonged loss of revenue.

The burden was especially severe for people who lacked substantial savings. Merchants could sometimes draw upon reserves or assistance from relatives, but labourers dependent on daily wages faced immediate hardship. Workers who abandoned their jobs for national reasons still needed to feed their families. Poorer households were therefore dependent upon relief funds, communal solidarity and informal systems of mutual assistance.

Women played an indispensable role in sustaining these networks. Palestinian women's associations had emerged as organized political forces after 1929, and the revolt expanded their activities. Women participated in demonstrations, collected contributions, organized charitable assistance and helped maintain communication between households and nationalist committees.

Their involvement was not confined to urban middle-class organizations. Rural women supplied food, carried information, warned fighters of approaching security forces and defended their communities during searches. Their experiences were shaped by class and geography: an educated activist in Jerusalem faced different circumstances from a peasant woman whose family depended upon land, livestock and seasonal agricultural work.

Women's participation challenged the assumption that nationalist politics belonged exclusively to male notables and fighters. Yet it did not eliminate established gender hierarchies. Women often performed essential organizational and logistical work while remaining excluded from formal political leadership.*12

The strike was accompanied by growing armed resistance. Rebel bands attacked roads, railways, telephone lines, police positions and Jewish settlements. Some attacks were directed against the infrastructure of British rule, while others targeted Jewish civilians and property. The distinction between resistance to a colonial government and violence against an ethnic or religious community became increasingly difficult to maintain in practice.

The British authorities responded with emergency regulations, troop reinforcements, arrests, curfews and collective punishments. The government sought to preserve communications, protect settlements and demonstrate that the strike would not determine imperial policy.

In June 1936, British forces demolished substantial portions of Jaffa's old city. The authorities presented the operation as a measure intended to improve access and security, but it also served counterinsurgency purposes and displaced hundreds of families. The destruction became one of the most visible symbols of British coercive power and of the civilian costs of the revolt.

A broad street cut through Jaffa's old city following British demolition operations in 1936. The destruction was carried out during the Arab general strike and displaced residents of the surrounding neighbourhoods.

Collective fines imposed on villages and neighbourhoods punished communities for alleged support of insurgents or failure to cooperate with authorities. Such measures placed pressure on people who might have had little influence over armed fighters operating nearby. British military methods increasingly treated the wider population as an instrument through which insurgent resistance could be weakened.*13

During the summer, the armed campaign gained momentum. Rural bands operated across parts of the hill country, and volunteers from neighbouring Arab territories joined the struggle. Among the most prominent was Fawzi al-Qawuqji, a Syrian-born military officer who entered Palestine and assumed a significant role in insurgent operations.

His involvement demonstrated both the regional appeal of the rebellion and the difficulties of coordinating armed resistance. Fighters possessed varying experiences, political loyalties and relationships with local communities. Some followed commanders associated with particular districts, while others responded to religious, nationalist or personal allegiances. The revolt was never a unified military organization comparable to a regular army.

By the autumn, the strike had become increasingly costly. The British government remained unwilling to concede immediate Arab-majority independence or end Jewish immigration altogether. At the same time, the authorities sought a political opening that might bring the initial confrontation to an end.

The rulers of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Transjordan appealed to Palestinian leaders to suspend the strike and permit an inquiry into their grievances. Their intervention reflected regional sympathy for the Palestinian cause, but also the diplomatic calculations of governments that had their own relationships with Britain.

In October 1936, the Arab Higher Committee called off the general strike. Six months of economic disruption and escalating violence had demonstrated considerable Palestinian capacity for collective mobilization, but had not achieved the principal political objectives. The suspension of the strike allowed the promised British investigation to proceed and created a temporary reduction in violence.*14

The Peel Commission and the Question of Partition

The Palestine Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Peel, investigated the causes of the disturbances and the functioning of the Mandate. It heard testimony from British officials, Zionist representatives and Palestinian Arab leaders, although the latter initially boycotted proceedings before agreeing to participate.

The commission encountered a fundamental political disagreement. Palestinian Arabs regarded the national home policy as incompatible with their right to self-government in a country where they constituted the majority. Zionist leaders maintained that the Jewish people possessed a legitimate national connection to Palestine and that Jewish immigration and settlement were central to the commitments Britain had undertaken.

The commission's report, published on July 7, 1937, reached a striking conclusion: the existing Mandate had become unworkable. The conflict between Arab and Jewish national aspirations could not be resolved merely through administrative improvements or economic development.

Rather than continuing the existing constitutional arrangement, the commission proposed partition. Its scheme envisaged an independent Jewish state in parts of the coastal plain and Galilee, an Arab state linked with Transjordan under Emir Abdullah, and continued British administration over Jerusalem, Bethlehem and a connecting corridor to the coast, together with arrangements for other important sites.

The proposal marked a significant change in British policy. The Balfour Declaration had endorsed a Jewish national home without explicitly defining it as a sovereign state. The Peel Commission now placed Jewish statehood, alongside Arab statehood, at the centre of a proposed political settlement.*15

Partition raised problems extending well beyond drawing borders. Arab and Jewish populations were geographically intermingled, and the proposed Jewish state contained a substantial Arab population. The commission estimated that approximately 225,000 Arabs lived in the territory allocated to the proposed Jewish state, while a much smaller number of Jews lived in the proposed Arab state.

The report therefore considered the transfer of land and population. It referred to the compulsory population exchange undertaken between Greece and Turkey after the First World War as a precedent and envisaged that transfers might ultimately have to be compulsory if voluntary arrangements proved insufficient.

This aspect of the proposal had profound implications. Partition was not simply a plan to establish two governments over populations already neatly separated by territory. It contemplated the possible uprooting of large numbers of people in order to construct the demographic foundations of the proposed states.

For Palestinian Arabs, the proposal threatened to transform the nationalist struggle from a demand for majority self-government into a process of territorial division and possible displacement. Even those who accepted that Jews should enjoy civil and religious rights within Palestine could reject a settlement that transferred sovereignty over parts of their country to a separate Jewish state.*16

The Arab Higher Committee rejected partition. Its position rested on the claim that the people of Palestine had a right to independence and that Britain lacked the legitimate authority to divide the country in fulfilment of the Zionist programme.

Among Zionist leaders, the reaction was more complicated. Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion recognized the importance of international acceptance of a Jewish state, however restricted its initial territory might be. Yet the proposed borders, economic arrangements and conditions for partition provoked substantial objections.

At the Twentieth Zionist Congress in August 1937, delegates rejected the specific Peel partition scheme as presented while authorizing the leadership to negotiate over a possible Jewish state. This was not an unconditional endorsement of the commission's map. It was an acceptance of negotiations based upon the possibility of sovereignty, combined with demands for major revisions.

Other Zionists opposed partition from different directions. Some believed the proposed Jewish territory was too small and would exclude important historic or strategic areas. Others remained committed to forms of binational or shared political existence. The Zionist movement was consequently united in seeking protection for the Jewish national home but divided over the territory and constitutional form of its future.*17

British policymakers also faced questions about the viability of partition. Proposed borders separated economic resources, complicated transport links and created difficult problems involving taxation, defence, water supplies and minority populations. The possible incorporation of an Arab state into Transjordan raised further questions about the political agency of Palestinian Arabs themselves.

In 1938, a further commission chaired by Sir John Woodhead examined possible partition arrangements. Its conclusions were discouraging. The administrative, financial and political obstacles were so substantial that the British government announced in November 1938 that partition had proved impracticable under the circumstances.

The movement from the Peel proposal to the Woodhead conclusion revealed a larger problem: British policymakers could recognize the incompatibility of existing commitments without finding a workable alternative.

The legal framework of the Mandate, the distribution of populations, the aspirations of Arab and Jewish communities, and Britain's imperial interests did not produce a readily available constitutional solution. Every proposal seemed to require one or both national movements to surrender claims they regarded as fundamental.*18

Before the Woodhead report appeared, however, the conflict had already entered a far more violent phase.

From Popular Protest to Rural Insurgency, 1937–1939

On September 26, 1937, Lewis Andrews, the British acting district commissioner for Galilee, was assassinated near Nazareth. His killing provided the immediate occasion for a renewed government offensive against the Palestinian nationalist movement.

British authorities outlawed the Arab Higher Committee and its affiliated national committees, arrested political activists and moved against prominent nationalist leaders. Several were deported, while others escaped arrest. Hajj Amin al-Husayni fled Palestine and eventually established himself in Lebanon.

These measures disrupted the formal leadership of the movement at precisely the moment when armed resistance was expanding. The urban committees that had coordinated the strike could no longer operate openly, while rural fighters increasingly relied upon local commanders and informal support networks.*19

The rebellion entered its most intensive period during 1938. Across substantial areas of the countryside, armed groups challenged British authority, interrupted communications and exerted influence over villages. Rebel bands attacked roads and railway installations, sabotaged pipelines, ambushed police patrols and targeted Jewish settlements.

Some insurgent organizations attempted to go beyond military action by establishing local courts, collecting taxes, regulating movement and enforcing nationalist instructions. Their activities indicated an ambition to replace elements of colonial administration with institutions that claimed authority in the name of the Palestinian national movement.

Historian Charles W. Anderson has interpreted these developments as a form of state formation from below. Rather than treating the rural revolt solely as a collection of disconnected guerrilla operations, this perspective emphasizes the creation of alternative structures of authority and the capacity of ordinary people to sustain political organization during armed struggle.

Such institutions were uneven and temporary. Their legitimacy depended on local relationships and the ability of commanders to secure obedience, resources and protection. Nevertheless, they demonstrated that Palestinian nationalism during the revolt was not confined to speeches by urban elites or negotiations with British officials.*20

The countryside became the principal theatre of conflict partly because its geography favoured guerrilla warfare. The hills of central Palestine, the Galilee and other rural districts offered opportunities for movement, concealment and local support. British military power remained substantial, but maintaining continuous control over dispersed settlements and communications required extensive resources.

Village communities consequently occupied a precarious position. Farmers might sympathize with the rebels, shelter relatives or provide food and intelligence. Others might attempt to remain neutral, fearing British reprisals, rebel coercion or the loss of their livelihoods. Neutrality was not always possible when armed men demanded assistance and security forces demanded information.

The rebellion also exposed tensions within Palestinian Arab society. Some rural fighters resented wealthy landowners, merchants and established political families whose interests differed from those of poorer cultivators. Insurgent groups sometimes imposed taxes, demanded supplies and punished individuals accused of collaboration or insufficient commitment to the national cause.

The language of national unity could therefore coexist with coercion and social conflict. Rebel violence was directed not only against British personnel and Jews but also against Palestinian Arabs suspected of informing, resisting rebel demands or supporting rival factions.

Political rivalry intensified the violence. Supporters of the Husayni leadership and those associated with the Nashashibi family increasingly came into conflict. Some anti-rebel Palestinian militias, often called peace bands, cooperated with British authorities and received assistance associated with Jewish organizations. Their emergence reflected local rivalries, opposition to insurgent coercion and differing calculations about the likely outcome of the conflict.

The existence of these groups complicates any representation of the revolt as a struggle between three completely unified communities. Palestinian Arabs were divided over strategy and leadership, Jewish organizations differed over defence and retaliation, and British military and civilian officials did not always agree on the proper balance between repression and political accommodation.*21

British counterinsurgency became increasingly systematic. Military reinforcements arrived, and the army undertook operations intended to isolate armed bands from their civilian support networks. Roads were patrolled, villages searched, suspected rebels detained and communications routes fortified.

Emergency legislation gave the authorities extensive powers. Collective fines, curfews, house demolitions, restrictions on movement and detention without ordinary judicial procedures became significant instruments of control. Military courts imposed severe punishments, including death sentences, while administrative measures allowed officials to act against communities suspected of assisting insurgents.

The British also employed intelligence operations, informants and specialized police formations. Fortified police stations and frontier barriers became conspicuous features of the landscape. Along the northern frontier, a security fence associated with Sir Charles Tegart was intended to restrict the movement of insurgents, supplies and weapons across the border.

The campaign was not simply a succession of conventional battles between soldiers and rebels. It was an effort to make armed resistance impossible by controlling the social and physical environment in which insurgents operated.

Historian Matthew Hughes has demonstrated that British military repression was supported by a colonial legal system that authorized forms of collective punishment and retaliation. These methods could impose substantial suffering upon civilians irrespective of whether individual responsibility for insurgent activity had been established.*22

Some of the most controversial practices involved the treatment of civilians during military operations. Villages were subjected to destructive searches, food supplies and household possessions were damaged, and suspected sympathizers endured detention and physical abuse. British forces sometimes used Palestinians as human shields in operations involving dangerous roads or suspected mines, exposing civilians to risks that military personnel would otherwise have faced.

The experience of women during these operations was particularly significant. Palestinian women could lose their homes, livestock and possessions, be subjected to intrusive searches, or have family members imprisoned or killed. Rural women sometimes resisted searches, protected fugitives or warned villages of approaching troops, activities that placed them directly in the path of counterinsurgency.

British military records and contemporary complaints document violence and intimidation directed against civilians, although the surviving evidence is uneven. The extent of particular abuses must be assessed critically rather than assumed from either official denials or nationalist accusations. The broader pattern of coercive pacification, however, is well established in the scholarly literature.*23

British forces increasingly cooperated with Jewish security organizations. The Haganah, which had emerged as the principal defence organization of the Yishuv, expanded its capabilities during the revolt. Jewish settlement police and auxiliary formations operated with British support, while intelligence sharing and joint operations strengthened military cooperation.

Jewish Settlement Policemen employed by the British authorities to guard Palestine's railway network, August 23, 1938. British cooperation with Jewish security units strengthened their military capabilities during the revolt.

One particularly important development was the establishment of the Special Night Squads in 1938 under British officer Orde Wingate. These units combined British soldiers and Jewish personnel in offensive operations against insurgents, especially in the Galilee. Their methods included surprise attacks and punitive raids, and their activities later became important in discussions of the development of Jewish military organization and tactics.

The relationship between Britain and the Yishuv was therefore paradoxical. British policy continued to limit the political objectives of Zionism in certain respects, yet the suppression of the Arab rebellion strengthened Jewish defence institutions and gave some of their members valuable military experience.*24

Jewish responses to Arab violence were not uniform. Haganah leaders generally emphasized organized defence and a policy of restraint, although the meaning and application of restraint were contested. The Irgun, associated with Revisionist Zionism, increasingly favoured armed retaliation.

Irgun attacks in the later 1930s included bombings directed against Arab civilian targets, particularly marketplaces and other public spaces. These operations killed and wounded civilians who had no demonstrated connection to the insurgency. They reflected a deliberate rejection of restraint and contributed to cycles of fear and retaliatory violence.

Arab insurgent attacks likewise killed Jewish civilians, including workers, travellers and residents of settlements. Such violence cannot be understood simply as military action against the institutions of British administration. It also intensified communal insecurity and made future political coexistence more difficult.

For Jewish communities, the danger of attacks provided a powerful argument for organized defence and political security. For Palestinian Arabs, British cooperation with Jewish armed organizations reinforced the perception that the mandatory government was suppressing Arab national aspirations while facilitating the development of a rival national movement.

By the autumn of 1938, insurgent activity had reached an extraordinary level. British control had weakened across extensive rural districts, and rebels temporarily occupied important urban areas, including the Old City of Jerusalem. The government responded with further military reinforcements and renewed operations to restore its authority.

The British reoccupied the Old City in October 1938. Thereafter, increasingly concentrated military pressure, improved intelligence, local collaboration and the destruction of insurgent networks began to undermine the rebellion's ability to continue.*25

The defeat was not immediate. Armed resistance persisted into 1939, and the countryside continued to experience insecurity, reprisals and political intimidation. Yet the movement had become increasingly exhausted.

The population had endured years of economic disruption, mounting casualties and military repression. Internal divisions weakened coordination, while British operations deprived insurgents of weapons, supplies and experienced commanders. The rebellion's inability to obtain decisive regional military assistance further limited its prospects.

By the summer of 1939, large-scale resistance had substantially diminished. The British military had re-established sufficient control to bring the emergency towards an end, although the underlying political questions remained unresolved.

The White Paper of 1939: A Different Future Proposed

While the army was suppressing the rebellion, British policymakers increasingly reconsidered their approach to Palestine. The failure of partition, the damage caused by prolonged unrest and the deteriorating international situation all encouraged a search for a new settlement.

Britain's strategic calculations had become especially urgent. The rise of aggressive European powers, the threat of war and the importance of imperial communications through the Mediterranean and Middle East made relations with Arab governments increasingly significant. British leaders feared that continued unrest in Palestine could damage their position across the region.

In February and March 1939, representatives of the British government, Palestinian Arabs, neighbouring Arab states and the Jewish Agency participated in discussions at St. James's Palace in London. The negotiations did not produce an agreement. Arab and Jewish representatives differed fundamentally over the legitimacy of the national home policy, immigration, constitutional authority and the political future of Palestine.

The resulting British statement of policy, published on May 17, 1939, represented a substantial departure from earlier approaches.

The White Paper declared that Britain did not intend Palestine to become a Jewish state against the wishes of its Arab population. Instead, the government proposed an independent Palestine within ten years, in which Arabs and Jews would share governmental responsibilities and the rights of their respective communities would receive constitutional protection.

The proposal was conditional. Britain would retain authority during a transitional period, and independence depended upon the establishment of arrangements that the government considered capable of protecting both communities and ensuring effective administration. British authorities therefore retained substantial discretion over the process.*26

Immigration formed the most controversial part of the policy. The White Paper envisaged admitting approximately 75,000 Jewish immigrants over the following five years, subject to economic conditions. The total included an annual quota of 10,000 immigrants and a further 25,000 refugees, with special consideration for children and dependants.

After five years, additional Jewish immigration would require the acquiescence of Palestine's Arabs. The government also proposed powers to prohibit or restrict transfers of land in areas where further sales threatened the position of Arab cultivators.

These proposals addressed important Palestinian grievances. They recognized that unlimited immigration against the wishes of the majority could not continue indefinitely without perpetuating political conflict. They also acknowledged the relationship between land transfers, rural insecurity and the social foundations of the revolt.

Yet the White Paper did not meet the full demands of the Arab Higher Committee. It postponed independence, permitted additional immigration and did not immediately establish an Arab-majority government. The leadership associated with al-Husayni rejected it, although other Palestinian political figures and factions were more willing to consider cooperation.

The Zionist movement rejected the White Paper for very different reasons. Its immigration restrictions threatened the development of the Jewish national home and appeared to surrender the future of Jewish immigration to the consent of an Arab majority opposed to Zionism. The abandonment of a clear path towards Jewish statehood was likewise regarded as a major reversal.*27

The timing was especially grave. Nazi Germany had intensified its persecution of Jews, and the November 1938 pogrom known as Kristallnacht had demonstrated the increasing danger confronting Jewish communities. Hundreds of thousands sought refuge, while immigration barriers in numerous countries restricted their options.

For Jews attempting to escape Europe, Palestine was not merely an abstract national project. It was a potential refuge whose accessibility could become a matter of survival. The British decision to impose new limitations therefore possessed humanitarian consequences beyond the constitutional debate over Palestine.

At the same time, Palestinian Arab fears could not simply be dismissed because immigration was driven in part by persecution. Many Arabs regarded the demand that Palestine absorb increasing numbers of refugees as an attempt to resolve a European crisis through demographic and political changes imposed upon another population.

The international community's failure to provide sufficient refuge for European Jews sharpened a conflict already rooted in incompatible claims to political self-determination. The White Paper exposed how difficult it had become to address the rights and security of one population without affecting those of the other.

The approaching European war further altered the political context. Britain's immediate priorities increasingly concerned strategic stability, military commitments and relations with regional governments. The White Paper did not resolve the conflict, but it established the principal framework of British policy as the Second World War began.

It also made clear that the Mandate had reached a constitutional impasse. Britain had successively attempted to preserve its original commitments, consider partition and propose a unitary independent state. None of these approaches had produced agreement among the principal parties.

Outcome and Aftermath

The Great Arab Revolt ended in military defeat for the Palestinian insurgents. Estimates of casualties vary according to the sources and categories employed, but approximately 5,000 Palestinian Arabs are commonly estimated to have been killed during the rebellion and its suppression. Thousands more were wounded, detained or displaced. Approximately 400 Jews and more than 100 British personnel also lost their lives, although published totals differ.

The human consequences extended beyond those killed in combat. Civilian families lost property, livelihoods and relatives. Villages endured military searches, fines and destruction. Commercial disruption damaged Palestinian businesses, while prolonged insecurity interrupted education, agriculture and ordinary community life.

The rebellion also produced an enduring organizational imbalance. Palestinian Arab political institutions had been outlawed or weakened, leading figures were imprisoned or exiled, and substantial numbers of experienced fighters had been killed or dispersed. Weapons were confiscated, and the effects of internal conflict continued after the fighting ended.

The Yishuv emerged in a different position. Although Jewish communities had suffered attacks, insecurity and casualties, their political and economic organizations remained largely intact. Jewish defence capabilities had expanded, while cooperation with British security forces had provided training and operational experience. The separate Jewish economy had strengthened in important respects during the years of confrontation.*28

These differences would later affect the balance of political and military organization in Palestine. Yet it would be misleading to suggest that the events of 1948 were inevitable by 1939. The Second World War, the Holocaust, changes in British power, the emergence of the United States and Soviet Union as major international actors, and subsequent diplomatic decisions profoundly altered the situation.

At the conclusion of the revolt, the immediate reality was more limited but nonetheless consequential. Britain had defeated the largest Palestinian Arab uprising of the Mandate period without creating a political settlement acceptable to the populations it governed.

The British Empire retained control of Palestine, but the legitimacy and durability of that control had been severely damaged.

Historical and Cultural Significance

The Great Arab Revolt occupies a central place in Palestinian historical memory because it represented an extraordinary attempt to establish national agency under foreign rule. The strike of 1936 demonstrated the capacity of urban workers, merchants, students and political organizations to coordinate collective action across substantial portions of the country. The subsequent rural rebellion revealed a different source of political power, grounded in villages, local commanders and networks of mutual assistance. Taken together, these phases challenge interpretations of Palestinian nationalism as merely a movement directed by prominent Jerusalem families or religious leaders. They demonstrate the importance of organized labour, rural society and ordinary households in the formation of modern Palestinian political identity. The revolt's defeat did not erase its place in popular memory, where it survived through accounts of resistance, sacrifice, repression and the failure of established leadership.*29

Its significance also lies in the social history of rebellion. The experience of Palestinian women shows how political conflict could transform the relationship between domestic responsibilities and public action. Women organized demonstrations and relief activities, carried supplies and information, confronted military searches and helped sustain families facing imprisonment, displacement or economic ruin. Yet the revolt was not a straightforward story of social emancipation. Nationalist mobilization could strengthen conservative expectations as well as challenge them, while rural class tensions and coercion complicated the language of collective unity. The history of the uprising therefore belongs not only to diplomacy and military operations but also to the changing social relationships of interwar Palestine. Its memory has continued to be shaped by tensions between public commemoration and the more difficult experiences of collaboration, intimidation, factional violence and disagreement.*30

For the history of Jewish national development, the revolt was similarly transformative. The danger faced by Jewish civilians reinforced demands for organized defence, while the expansion of the Haganah and related institutions increased the Yishuv's capacity for independent action. The years of rebellion contributed to a stronger economic and security infrastructure, but they also exposed profound disagreements within Zionism over the use of force, the meaning of restraint and the territorial dimensions of future statehood. The Peel Commission made Jewish sovereignty a subject of explicit international consideration, while the 1939 White Paper revealed the vulnerability of Zionist ambitions to changes in British policy. These developments unfolded under the growing shadow of European antisemitism, which made immigration and refuge increasingly urgent. The history of the revolt consequently cannot be separated from the simultaneous experiences of Palestinian dispossession anxiety and Jewish insecurity, even though these experiences were different in origin and political consequence.*31

For the British Empire, Palestine exposed the limits of mandatory government and the contradictions of interwar liberal internationalism. The Mandate had been presented as a system through which imperial administration would prepare populations for eventual self-government, yet in Palestine the imperial power had undertaken obligations that placed the political rights of the majority in tension with the development of a separate national project. British officials repeatedly acknowledged the existence of legitimate grievances, while the army employed increasingly coercive methods to maintain authority. The resulting combination of constitutional experimentation and collective punishment resembled broader patterns of colonial rule elsewhere in the interwar world. The revolt demonstrated that an empire could achieve military victory while failing to establish a stable political order. Its suppression did not reconcile the populations under British authority; rather, it exposed the inadequacy of a system in which fundamental questions of sovereignty remained subject to imperial discretion.*32

Perhaps the most important historical lesson is the danger of treating the outcome as predetermined. In the late 1930s, Palestine's future was still contested through multiple proposals: continued mandatory rule, an Arab-majority independent state with minority protections, a Jewish state created through partition, and forms of shared or federated political authority. Each alternative encountered formidable obstacles, but their existence reminds us that contemporaries were making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The Great Arab Revolt changed the balance of forces, weakened Palestinian Arab institutions and compelled Britain to reconsider its commitments. It did not, by itself, determine the events of the following decade. Its wider significance lies in the intersection of empire, nationalism, migration, social inequality and competing demands for security and self-determination. To understand Palestine between 1936 and 1939 is to confront a political crisis in which the aspirations of different communities were real, the suffering of civilians was substantial, and the institutions entrusted with governing the country proved unable to devise a legitimate and durable settlement.


Sources and Further Reading

Scholarly Works

Anderson, Charles W. “State Formation from Below and the Great Revolt in Palestine.” Journal of Palestine Studies 47, no. 1 (2017): 39–55.

Fleischmann, Ellen. The Nation and Its “New” Women: The Palestinian Women's Movement, 1920–1948. University of California Press, 2003.

Hughes, Matthew. Britain's Pacification of Palestine: The British Army, the Colonial State, and the Arab Revolt, 1936–1939. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Hughes, Matthew. “Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39.” The Journal of Military History 83 (2019): 487–507.

Kelly, Matthew Kraig. The Crime of Nationalism: Britain, Palestine, and Nation-Building on the Fringe of Empire. University of California Press, 2017.

Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. Columbia University Press, 1997.

Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Beacon Press, 2006.

Lockman, Zachary. Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948. University of California Press, 1996.

Segev, Tom. One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate. Metropolitan Books, 2000.

Swedenburg, Ted. Memories of Revolt: The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past. University of Minnesota Press, 1995.

Wagner, Steven. Statecraft by Stealth: Secret Intelligence and British Rule in Palestine. Cornell University Press, 2019.

Primary Sources

League of Nations. Mandate for Palestine, approved July 24, 1922. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1922v02/d233

Palestine Royal Commission. Report, July 1937 (Peel Commission).

Palestine Partition Commission. Report, 1938 (Woodhead Commission).

British Government. Palestine: Statement of Policy, May 1939 (1939 White Paper). https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_Century/brwh1939.asp

British Government. Political History of Palestine under British Administration, memorandum prepared for the United Nations, 1947.


  1. Matthew Hughes, Britain's Pacification of Palestine: The British Army, the Colonial State, and the Arab Revolt, 1936–1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2019); Ori Yehudai, “The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine,” Origins, Ohio State University, https://origins.osu.edu/read/1936-1939-arab-revolt-palestine. ↩
  2. Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (Columbia University Press, 1997); Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Beacon Press, 2006). ↩
  3. Arthur James Balfour, declaration of November 2, 1917, incorporated into the preamble of the League of Nations, Mandate for Palestine, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1922v02/d233; Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate (Metropolitan Books, 2000). ↩
  4. League of Nations, Mandate for Palestine, Articles 2, 4 and 6, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1922v02/d233; Khalidi, The Iron Cage. ↩
  5. Khalidi, The Iron Cage; Steven Wagner, Statecraft by Stealth: Secret Intelligence and British Rule in Palestine (Cornell University Press, 2019); Segev, One Palestine, Complete. ↩
  6. Yehudai, “The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine,” https://origins.osu.edu/read/1936-1939-arab-revolt-palestine; British Government, Palestine: Statement of Policy, May 1939, Section II, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_Century/brwh1939.asp. ↩
  7. Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948 (University of California Press, 1996). The study examines economic cooperation, employment disputes and the development of separate national labour institutions. ↩
  8. Segev, One Palestine, Complete; Lockman, Comrades and Enemies; British Government, Political History of Palestine under British Administration (1947), https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185776/. ↩
  9. Khalidi, The Iron Cage; Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past (University of Minnesota Press, 1995). ↩
  10. Lockman, Comrades and Enemies; Yehudai, “The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine,” https://origins.osu.edu/read/1936-1939-arab-revolt-palestine. ↩
  11. Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. See especially the analysis of Arab dockworkers, transport unions, the general strike and the Histadrut's response. ↩
  12. Ellen Fleischmann, The Nation and Its “New” Women: The Palestinian Women's Movement, 1920–1948 (University of California Press, 2003); Ellen Fleischmann, “The Emergence of the Palestinian Women's Movement, 1929–39,” Journal of Palestine Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 16–32; Matthew Hughes, “Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39,” The Journal of Military History 83 (2019): 487–507. ↩
  13. Matthew Hughes, “From Law and Order to Pacification: Britain's Suppression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39,” Journal of Palestine Studies 39, no. 2 (2010); British House of Commons, debate concerning the demolition of houses in Jaffa, June 24, 1936, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1936/jun/24/jaffa-demolition-of-houses. ↩
  14. Lockman, Comrades and Enemies; British Government, Political History of Palestine under British Administration (1947), https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185776/; Charles W. Anderson, “State Formation from Below and the Great Revolt in Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 47, no. 1 (2017): 39–55. ↩
  15. Palestine Royal Commission, Report, July 1937, https://www.palquest.org/en/historictext/6719/peel-commission-report. The commission concluded that the existing Mandate was unworkable and recommended territorial partition. ↩
  16. Palestine Royal Commission, Report, July 1937, discussion of partition, population distribution and transfer, https://www.palquest.org/en/historictext/6719/peel-commission-report. ↩
  17. United Nations, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part I, discussion of the Peel Commission and Zionist Congress, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-199840/; Segev, One Palestine, Complete. ↩
  18. Palestine Partition Commission, Report, 1938, https://www.palquest.org/en/historictext/6721/palestine-partition-commission-woodhead-commission-report; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, volume II, document 809, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1938v02/d809. ↩
  19. Anderson, “State Formation from Below and the Great Revolt in Palestine,” 39–55; Hughes, Britain's Pacification of Palestine; Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, historical appendix, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_Century/angap04.asp. ↩
  20. Anderson, “State Formation from Below and the Great Revolt in Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 47, no. 1 (2017): 39–55. Anderson examines insurgent taxation, courts, administration and attempts to establish alternative authority. ↩
  21. Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt; Hughes, Britain's Pacification of Palestine; Matthew Hughes, “Palestinian Collaboration with the British: The Peace Bands and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–9,” Journal of Contemporary History. ↩
  22. Hughes, Britain's Pacification of Palestine; Hughes, “From Law and Order to Pacification”; Matthew Kraig Kelly, The Crime of Nationalism: Britain, Palestine, and Nation-Building on the Fringe of Empire (University of California Press, 2017). ↩
  23. Hughes, “Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39,” 487–507; Charles W. Anderson, “When Palestinians Became Human Shields: Counterinsurgency, Racialization, and the Great Revolt (1936–1939),” Comparative Studies in Society and History (2021), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/when-palestinians-became-human-shields-counterinsurgency-racialization-and-the-great-revolt-19361939/C0A6393722B3B92BEB55382B27ED6467. ↩
  24. Matthew Hughes, “Terror in Galilee: British-Jewish Collaboration and the Special Night Squads in Palestine during the Arab Revolt, 1938–39,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History; Wagner, Statecraft by Stealth. ↩
  25. Hughes, Britain's Pacification of Palestine; Anderson, “State Formation from Below and the Great Revolt in Palestine”; British Government, Political History of Palestine under British Administration (1947), https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185776/. ↩
  26. British Government, Palestine: Statement of Policy, May 1939, Section I, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_Century/brwh1939.asp; Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, historical appendix, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_Century/angap04.asp. ↩
  27. British Government, Palestine: Statement of Policy, May 1939, Sections II and III, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_Century/brwh1939.asp; Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, historical appendix, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_Century/angap04.asp. ↩
  28. Yehudai, “The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine”; Hughes, Britain's Pacification of Palestine; Khalidi, The Iron Cage. The casualty figures are estimates and differ between accounts because of variations in the period covered and the treatment of combat deaths, civilian casualties and internal violence. ↩
  29. Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt; Anderson, “State Formation from Below and the Great Revolt in Palestine”; Khalidi, Palestinian Identity. ↩
  30. Fleischmann, The Nation and Its “New” Women; Hughes, “Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39”; Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt. ↩
  31. Lockman, Comrades and Enemies; Segev, One Palestine, Complete; Wagner, Statecraft by Stealth; Palestine Royal Commission, Report, July 1937. ↩
  32. Hughes, Britain's Pacification of Palestine; Kelly, The Crime of Nationalism; Wagner, Statecraft by Stealth; Khalidi, The Iron Cage. ↩

Did you enjoy this article?

Recommend it — Standard Reader surfaces well-loved writing to more readers across the network.

Across the AtmosphereDiscussions