I've been running a service that listens to the firehose on four different relays: It keeps track of the last time each did created any records (posted, reposted, liked, followed, unfollowed, blocked, etc.) This is the source of my 'recently active users' list: I looked at all dids that had been active in the previous 30 days.
For each of these users, I used a local replica of https://plc.directory/ to look at rotation keys and PDSes for each account.
Overall, I looked at 5,061,238 accounts, though the denominator for most percentages is 5,027,444 for reasons explained below. 94.15% of all accounts were on Bluesky PBC's servers; with the correction explained below, 94.15% of accounts considered on are Bluesky servers.
The Bluesky PDSes use the same two rotation keys for all DIDs. If you do not add a rotation key, Bluesky can theoretically prevent you from moving your account elsewhere. Some types of account takedown, for example, prevent migration.
I looked for strong ownership over identities on the Bluesky PDSes by looking for did:plc identities on those PDSes with at least one additional unique rotation key.
I found 1,293 accounts on solo PDSes (PDSes with only one active user). This is 0.0257% of accounts I considered. Of these, 186 (14.39%) have multiple rotation keys.
If a PDS hosts only one repository, we can probably assume that it is self-hosted or otherwise under the control of its sole user, and we can assume that the user will be able to keep control of their identity.
The reference PDS uses a single rotation key for all accounts. It is still useful to add another, so that if all data from the PDS is lost (including the private half of its rotation key), the user still has a way to keep control of their identity.
I found 260,481 accounts on multi-user PDSes (5.18% of accounts considered). Of these, 13,201 (5.07% of multi-user PDS accounts) have strong ownership of their identities
PDSes operated by entities other than Bluesky still carry potential risk, with the risk simply shifted to another party. Thus, it is still a good idea to have your own rotation key even if you are on a third-party PDS.
In most cases, most or all users on multi-user PDSes have the same rotation key, controlled by the PDS. I identified users with stronger control over their identities by looking for users on these PDSes that have additional, unique, rotation keys not shared by any other users on their PDS.
Users on third-party multi-user PDSes are currently much more likely to have custom rotation keys than those on Bluesky's PDSes. This is probably due in part to these users being more aware of the functioning of the protocol and having heightened sensitivity to issues of distributed identity. I would also attribute this to some of the PDS movers having built-in features to add personal rotation keys as part of the process, which I think is an excellent feature.
I found 265 accounts using did:web (0.00527% of accounts considered)
did:web is an alternative way of managing your identity that uses a different method for claiming ownership - we can assume that these accounts have strong ownership over their identity.
If you are not sure whether your account uses a did:web, then it does not. It is not currently possible to migrate from a did:plc identity to a did:web (or any other type of did) identity.
I found 33,794 identities that fell into special cases that I excluded from the totals (0.666% of all identities)
In particular, the Bridgy Fed PDS seems to handle rotation keys differently than most other PDSes, in that it gives all users two rotation keys, and these rotation keys are unique to the account.
On the one hand, I know of no way for Bridgy Fed users to control rotation keys (or other aspects of their accounts), so users do not have strong control of their identity. On the other hand, these are accounts bridged in from other networks, so the repos on Bridgy Fed are not the authoritative source of information for these accounts anyway. I thus exclude them from my counts.
There were 410 other DIDs that I had trouble classifying due to being on PDSes that may or may not use individualized rotation keys, but I could not tell.
In addition, 8,270 did:plc accounts did not seem to have usable rotation keys and/or PDS service records at all; they may have been deleted.