A new scale of belief in the unknown

In many recent discussions about secular ideas around Buddhism, I have been accused, without anyone first asking me what I actually believe, of outright denying that karma, rebirth, or other Buddhist cosmological claims are true. I have also been told that my position is dishonest because I cannot "know" for certain that these things are untrue.

This got me thinking about something called the Dawkins Scale of Belief.

Richard Dawkins introduced the scale in The God Delusion as a way of describing different degrees of belief in God. It is useful because it shows that belief and disbelief are not necessarily absolute positions. There is a spectrum between complete certainty and complete rejection.

However, because the original scale focuses specifically on belief in God, I want to propose a modestly updated version. This version includes not only belief in one particular god, but also belief in multiple gods, supernatural beings, creators, spiritual forces, rebirth, karma, and other cosmological claims about the nature or origin of reality.

I also want to be clear that I am not arguing that people who hold extreme positions are necessarily dishonest. A person can sincerely believe something with complete certainty. My argument is simply that absolute certainty is difficult to justify when discussing claims that are not testable or observable.

The Original Dawkins Scale

Dawkins's scale goes something like this:

1. Strong theist.
   I assign a 100 percent probability to the existence of God. In the words of Carl Jung: "I do not believe, I know."
2. De facto theist.
   I assign a very high probability to the existence of God, though not an absolute 100 percent. I do not know for certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption that God is there. This includes agnostic theism.
3. Leaning toward theism.
   I assign a probability greater than 50 percent to the existence of God, but not a very high probability. I am very uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God. This also includes agnostic theism.
4. Completely impartial.
   I assign exactly equal probability to the existence and non-existence of God. I regard both possibilities as equiprobable.
5. Leaning toward atheism.
   I assign a probability lower than 50 percent to the existence of God, but not a very low probability. I do not know whether God exists, but I am inclined to be skeptical. This includes agnostic atheism.
6. De facto atheist.
   I assign a very low probability to the existence of God, though not an absolute zero. I do not know for certain that God does not exist, but I regard God's existence as highly improbable and live my life on the assumption that God is not there. This can include implicit and explicit atheism, positive and negative atheism, and agnostic atheism.
7. Strong atheist.
   I assign a probability of zero to the existence of God. I know there is no God, with the same conviction that Jung claims to know there is one. This can include implicit and explicit atheism, as well as positive and negative atheism.

A Broader Scale

For my purposes, I would revise the scale as follows:

1. Strong believer. (Gnostic Theist)
   I assign a 100 percent probability to the claim in question. I do not merely believe it. I regard it as known.
   The claim might be that God exists, that one or more gods exist, that a particular religious tradition is true, that karma operates across lifetimes, that rebirth occurs, or that a particular cosmological account accurately describes reality.
   In Carl Jung's words: "I do not believe, I know."
2. De facto believer.
   I assign a very high probability to the claim, though not an absolute 100 percent. I do not know for certain, but I strongly believe the claim is true and live my life on that assumption.
   This could include someone who strongly believes in God or gods, literal rebirth, supernatural karma, a cosmic purpose, or another religious or cosmological claim. It includes agnostic theism and comparable forms of strong but non-absolute belief.
3. Leaning toward belief.
   I assign the claim a probability greater than 50 percent, but not a very high probability. I am quite uncertain, yet I am inclined to believe that the claim is true.
   For example: "I am uncertain whether God or gods exist, but I think their existence is more likely than not."
   This category can include agnostic theism, tentative belief in rebirth or karma, or a general sense that the universe has some form of purpose or intelligence behind it.
4. Completely impartial.
   I assign exactly equal probability to the claim and its negation. I regard the available evidence as evenly balanced, or I believe there is insufficient evidence to favor either position.
   For example: "The existence and non-existence of God or gods are exactly equiprobable."
   This position does not necessarily mean that someone has no thoughts or feelings about the subject. It means that, intellectually, they regard belief and disbelief as equally justified.
5. Leaning toward disbelief.
   I assign the claim a probability lower than 50 percent, but not a very low probability. I do not know whether the claim is true, but I am inclined to doubt it.
   For example: "I do not know whether God or gods exist, but I am inclined to be skeptical."
   This category can include agnostic atheism, tentative disbelief in rebirth or karma, or skepticism about other religious and cosmological claims.
6. De facto disbeliever.
   I assign the claim a very low probability, though not an absolute zero. I do not know for certain that it is false, but I regard it as highly improbable and live my life on the assumption that it is not true.
   Someone in this category might say: "I have seen no compelling evidence that gods exist, that consciousness survives death, or that karma operates across lifetimes. I therefore live as though these claims are false, while acknowledging that I cannot prove their impossibility."
   This category may include implicit or explicit atheism, positive or negative atheism, and agnostic atheism, as well as disbelief in particular religious or cosmological claims.
7. Strong disbeliever. (Gnostic Atheist)
   I assign the claim a probability of zero, or regard its falsehood as certain. I am convinced that there are no gods, that a particular god does not exist, or that a specific cosmological claim is false.
   This position carries the same degree of conviction as the strong believer's corresponding positive claim. Someone at this level might say: "I know there are no gods," or "I know rebirth is impossible."

Where I Fit

This scale is useful because it helps dispel several common misconceptions about atheism and skepticism. The most important is the assumption that anyone who rejects belief in a god must be claiming absolute certainty that no god exists.

That is not how most atheists understand their position.

The two endpoints of the scale, absolute belief and absolute disbelief, are possible positions, but they are also the positions that require the greatest epistemic confidence. A person at level 1 says, in effect, "I know that God exists." A person at level 7 says, "I know that no god exists."

Both people may be sincere. But sincerity is not the same thing as justification. When a claim is defined in a way that places it beyond testing or observation, certainty becomes difficult to defend.

Most religious believers I encounter would probably fall somewhere around level 2. They may not claim mathematical certainty, but they have a strong enough belief in God, gods, karma, rebirth, or another religious framework that they use it to interpret the world and guide their lives.

Most nonbelievers, by contrast, probably fall somewhere between levels 5 and 6. They do not believe that gods exist, but they also do not claim to possess absolute knowledge that no god could possibly exist.

Their position is not, "I have disproved every possible deity."

It is closer to, "I have seen no compelling reason to believe that any deity exists, so I withhold belief."

This position is often described as agnostic atheism. In philosophical terms, the two words answer different questions. "Agnostic" describes what someone claims to know, while "atheist" describes what someone believes.

An agnostic atheist does not claim certainty that gods do not exist, but they also do not believe that gods exist.

In ordinary English, however, the word agnostic is often used to describe someone who is exactly undecided, someone sitting at level 4 and assigning equal probability to belief and disbelief.

That is not where I am.

I am not 50/50 on the question of whether gods exist. I see no compelling reason to believe that they do. At the same time, I am not arrogant enough to claim absolute certainty about an untestable proposition.

For that reason, I would place myself around level 6.

Belief Is Not the Same as Knowledge

This distinction matters in discussions about secular Buddhism.

I have sometimes been accused of denying that rebirth, karma, or other Buddhist cosmological claims are false, while also being told that my position is dishonest because I cannot "know" they are untrue.

But this treats knowledge and belief as though they were opposites. They are not.

I can lack certainty that a proposition is false while still having very little reason to believe that it is true. I can also reject a claim provisionally without claiming to have disproved every possible version of it.

That is how we approach many questions in ordinary life. We do not need absolute proof that a distant, invisible, undetectable object is not in the room before deciding not to spend our time looking for it.

The burden of justification also matters. If someone claims that consciousness survives death, that actions generate effects across multiple lifetimes, or that the universe contains a moral mechanism invisible to scientific observation, the question is not simply whether I can disprove the claim.

The question is why anyone should believe it in the first place.

"I cannot prove that this is false" is not evidence that it is true. Nor is it a reason to treat belief and disbelief as equally supported.

My Position on Karma and Rebirth

When I hear that I am rejecting rebirth or karma as absolutely untrue, I have to push back.

That is not my position.

At least for now, I would place myself around level 6 on those claims, perhaps occasionally drifting toward level 5 depending on how broadly the terms are defined.

There is an important complication here. Karma and rebirth can refer to different things.

If karma means a supernatural moral accounting system that produces consequences across lifetimes, I find that claim highly improbable. If karma means that actions have consequences, that habits shape character, or that cruelty tends to damage relationships and communities, then I regard it as an ordinary observation about human behavior.

Likewise, if rebirth means that an individual personality, soul, or stream of consciousness literally continues into another life, I do not find the evidence persuasive.

But if rebirth is used metaphorically to describe the way our actions continue through other people, institutions, memories, and consequences, then I find the idea meaningful.

A person can be reborn into a new way of living without having died and entered another body. A harmful habit can end, and a different version of the self can emerge. A parent's values can continue through their children. A teacher's influence can persist in students they may never see again.

None of this proves literal rebirth. It simply shows that a concept can contain psychological or ethical meaning without being a literal description of the universe.

Literal Truth and Metaphorical Value

This is where my own position becomes less about probability and more about practice.

I may place a claim at level 5 or 6 intellectually, while trying to live my life at level 4 existentially. I do not mean that I treat the claim as exactly 50/50. I mean that I do not want to make my life dependent on resolving a question that may be impossible to resolve.

I do not need to decide whether rebirth is literally true before asking what the concept can teach me. I can examine the idea metaphorically without pretending that the metaphor has been established as fact.

A metaphorical reading of karma might encourage me to pay attention to how intentions become habits, how habits shape character, and how character affects other people.

A metaphorical reading of rebirth might remind me that versions of me are continually ending and beginning. The person I was yesterday is not exactly the person I am today. Parts of my life also continue in the people I influence, the work I create, and the consequences of my actions.

These interpretations do not prove the supernatural claims. They also do not need to.

A story, ritual, or philosophical image can have psychological and ethical value without being a literal account of the universe.

My concern is not that people find meaning in these ideas. My concern is when metaphor is presented as knowledge, or when uncertainty is used to demand belief.

I am comfortable saying, "I do not know for certain."

I am equally comfortable saying, "I see no good reason to believe it."

Those statements are not contradictory. They are the basis of intellectual humility.

Living Without a Final Answer

There is a difference between refusing to believe a claim and insisting that the claim is impossible.

There is also a difference between uncertainty and neutrality.

I am uncertain about whether gods exist, whether consciousness can survive death, and whether some form of cosmic reality exists beyond what we can currently observe. But uncertainty does not require me to give every possibility equal weight.

There are countless things I cannot disprove. That does not mean I should believe all of them, or even treat them as equally plausible.

I can remain open to new evidence without pretending that every claim has earned equal consideration. I can acknowledge that I might be wrong without abandoning standards for what counts as a good reason to believe something.

That is where I think skepticism is often misunderstood. Skepticism is not the claim that nothing is true. It is the practice of adjusting confidence according to evidence.

If convincing evidence for literal rebirth or supernatural karma ever became available, I would want to consider it. But until then, I see no reason to treat those claims as established facts.

For now, I am comfortable placing myself at level 6.

I do not claim absolute certainty that these things are false. I simply find them highly improbable, unsupported by convincing evidence, and unnecessary for living an ethical or meaningful life.

If the ideas of karma and rebirth can still help me become more compassionate, more reflective, and more responsible, without requiring me to regard them as literal truths, then that is the relationship I am willing to have with them.