Workshop | New Developments in Epistemology and Metaphysics
13 July 2026 | 10h00-18h00 | Sala do Departamento de Filosofia | Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto The workshop New Developments in Epistemology and Metaphysics brings together researchers working on a range of contemporary issues in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the philosophy of artificial intelligence. The programme explores topics including the...
13 July 2026 | 10h00-18h00 | Sala do Departamento de Filosofia | Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto
The workshop New Developments in Epistemology and Metaphysics brings together researchers working on a range of contemporary issues in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the philosophy of artificial intelligence. The programme explores topics including the nature of epistemic luck and risk, scepticism, inquiry, metaphysical modality, free will and fatalism, scientific incommensurability, and the epistemic implications of artificial intelligence. By fostering dialogue across these interconnected areas, the workshop aims to promote philosophical reflection on the nature of knowledge, reality, rationality, and emerging intelligent technologies. It provides an open and collaborative forum for researchers, students, and anyone interested in recent developments in analytic philosophy.
Presentation format: Each presentation consists of 30 minutes, followed by 10 minutes for questions and discussion.
Session 1 – Artificial Intelligence (10:00–11:20)
10:00–10:40
Domingos Faria (University of Porto)
In What Sense Can AI Systems Possess Epistemic Expertise and Authority?
10:40–11:20
Gabriel Malagutti (University of Lisbon)
Medical AI: Justification & Responsibility
11:20–11:30 | Coffee Break
Session 2 – Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science (11:30–13:00)
11:30–12:10
José Machado (University of Porto)
Popperian and Logical Positivist Readings on Elgin’s Argument for Paradigm Incommensurability: An Analysis
12:10–12:50
Fabio Lampert (University of Vienna)
On Valid Arguments for Fatalism and Incompatibilism
13:00–15:00 | Lunch
Session 3 – Scepticism and Inquiry (15:00–16:20)
15:00–15:40
Joshua Thorpe (University of Lisbon)
Scepticism: Position or Paradox?
15:40–16:20
Giada Fratantonio (University of Lisbon)
When Is a Question Open?
16:20–16:30 | Coffee Break
Session 4 – Modality and Epistemic Luck (16:30–18:00)
16:30–17:10
Marco António Dias (University of Porto)
From the Actualism of the Substance of the World to the Possibilism of States of Affairs
17:10–17:50
Tiago Veloso (University of Barcelona)
A Wrong Way to Get Right: A Proposal on Epistemic Luck
18:00 | Closing Remarks
More info: https://ifilosofia.up.pt/activities/workshop-new-developments-epistemology-metaphysics
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